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Abstract 
There are ongoing debates in the literature concerning the performance of family firms: some 
studies find superior performance among these companies, others find negative or neutral per-
formance effects. In this research we employ agency theory to argue that the effects of family 
ownership vs. family management will be quite different: the former is expected to contribute 
positively to performance, the latter is argued to erode performance. Previous studies, due to 
problems of omitted variables or multicollinearity have been unable to distinguish these effects. 
Using a Bayesian approach that avoids these problems, we find that whereas family and founder 
ownership are associated with superior performance, the results for family management and even 
founder management are far more ambiguous. Our results have implications regarding the own-
ership and management of lone founder and family firms. 
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“In general the wisest course for any business, family or nonfamily, is to move to professional 
management as quickly as possible” Levinson (1971, pp. 98). 
 
1. Introduction 
Previous research on family firm performance has been rife with disagreements, with some stud-
ies finding family firms to outperform (e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003; McConaughy et al., 1998; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Weber et al., 2003), others studies finding them to underperform 
(e.g. Claessens et al., 2002; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988), and others still finding that family 
firms do not differ in their performance from their non-family cohorts (Miller et al., 2007). Cer-
tainly, there has been some discussion that different types of family or lone founder businesses 
perform differently, depending on the generation of the family involved (e.g., Bennedsen et al., 
2007; Perez-Gonzales, 2006) and the number of family members (Miller et al., 2007). Founder 
generation firms and those with a single founder present are said to outperform other “family” 
businesses. Results also vary according to the samples (Fortune 500/ 1000 vs. S&P 500) and pe-
riods studied, and the indicators of performance – market to book ratio (Tobin’s q) versus return 
on assets. 
We believe that for both theoretical and methodological reasons, one very important 
source of the conflicting findings on the performance of family firms has been ignored: namely 
that family ownership and family management have very different, and perhaps even opposite 
effects on performance. The theoretical rationale is as follows. Agency theory would suggest that 
concentrated ownership is associated with lower agency costs. Specifically, the monitoring pow-
er and incentives of major owners reduces information asymmetries between owners and manag-
ers, minimizing the chances that managers will misallocate firm resources to serve selfish pur-
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poses (Demsetz, 1988; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Because family firms have concentrated 
ownership, they will benefit from lower agency costs and outperform. However, those advan-
tages may be absent under – or even negated by – family management. Family managers may 
decide to use the resources of the business for the particular benefit of their own families, and in 
the process oppress smaller shareholders (Morck et al., 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). They 
may also be less competent than outsiders as they are relatively immune to dismissal for incom-
petence and come from a smaller selection pool (Burkart et al., 2003; Claessens et al., 2002; 
Volpin, 2002). In short, there are good conceptual reasons for believing that family ownership 
and family management may exert opposing influences on performance. The same might be said 
for lone founder ownership and management, which may be why founders are often released af-
ter their firms go public (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Our argument is not only of conceptual 
significance it also has practical governance implications regarding ownership and management 
of lone founder and family firms. 
Our second concern is methodological. Although prior studies have taken into account 
both ownership and management, they have been required to do so in separate predictive models 
given the high correlations among family ownership and management (usually between 0.5 and 
0.7). Typically, the results for ownership and management have converged, we suspect because 
of that high correlation (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2007; Villalonga and Amit, 
2006). Unfortunately, there may well be a confounding effect at work here: any perceived advan-
tage to family (or founder) management might actually be due to family (or founder) ownership. 
As we have argued above, there may not be any advantage to family management. In short, whe-
reas family and founder ownership reduce agency costs, family and founder management may 
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negate those advantages. Thus these two dimensions of governance may have very different ef-
fects on performance. 
As noted, because of the high correlation between family/ founder ownership and family/ 
founder management, previous research, using conventional methods of regression, has con-
founded these influences. The present study will avoid that problem by using Bayesian regres-
sion analyses which are able to encompass ownership and management in the same models, 
without incurring problems of multicollinearity. Bayesian methods also have an advantage in 
that their results are not point estimates but entire distribution functions of the effects of interest. 
Bayesian analysis allows statements of likely and unlikely effects. Thus, we are able to specify 
the probability of family and founder management and family and founder ownership having  
positive effects rather than merely reporting a regression coefficient which is either significant or 
not. That way, Bayesian analysis avoids the danger of non-significant, but potentially important, 
results not being reported (Cohen, 1994; Schmidt, 1996; Starbuck, 2006). 
This study of S&P 500 companies between 1994 and 2003 shows that over 90% of the 
time, a higher level of family or founder ownership leads to outperformance. By contrast, family 
managed companies are outperformed by their non family managed companies in over 50% of 
the cases, although lone-founder CEOs do somewhat better than that. In short, family influences 
are Janus-faced: ownership effects are positive, management effects ambiguous, or even nega-
tive. Subsequent studies would be well advised to take those differences into account. 
We shall first elaborate agency arguments for the performance advantages of family and 
founder ownership, and then argue for the performance disadvantages of family and founder 
management. Then we shall present our sample and methods, describing the particular appropri-
ateness of Bayesian regressions in eliminating the multicollinearity problem that has affected all 
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prior studies in this domain. We conclude by presenting and discussing our results and their im-
plications. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
Following the practice of Miller et al. (2007), we shall distinguish between family and lone 
founder owned firms; we shall also distinguish between family and lone founder managed firms.  
 
2.1 Agency Arguments Concerning Family and Founder Ownership 
The central contention of agency theory is that ownership concentration enhances performance. 
Large owners have both the incentive and the power to effectively monitor their managerial 
agents, and thereby reduce information asymmetries between themselves and their managers. 
This reduces agency costs and thus enhances performance (Demsetz, 1988; Fama, 1980; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). This has been borne out in numerous empirical analyses (see the reviews 
of Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Morck et al., 2005). Compared to more remote shareholders, 
family or founder owners often are better able to understand their businesses because of their 
more intimate connections to the firm. Their significant ownership also gives them access to in-
formation. This may be especially true where the founders are still present as major owners as 
their experience with the company lends them particular expertise (Ward, 2004). Finally, major 
family and founder owners have the incentive to monitor the business closely. They have a great 
deal of their fortune and their family’s future invested there, and that induces many of these 
owners to become careful stewards of their companies (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). Thus both, lone founder and family owners should be beneficial to firm per-
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formance from an agency perspective. Following the conventional agency rationale, we suggest 
the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 1: Family and founder ownership will be positively associated with superior  
 performance. 
 
2.2 Agency Arguments Concerning Family and Founder Management 
Certainly, it can be argued that founder or family management can have a positive effect on per-
formance. Founders or family executives may have profound knowledge about the businesses to 
which they have long been attached (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005). They may also have an 
incentive to perform well as poor performance may erode family reputation or incur the disap-
proval of other family owners (Arrègle et al., 2007). 
But there are a different, more negative set of forces at work when founders or their fam-
ily members run public companies. These sometimes fall under the heading of entrenchment 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Volpin 2002) – a situation in which a member of the founding fam-
ily or founder acting as a powerful manager may divert the resources of the firm to personal 
benefit (Morck et al., 2005). For example, the manager may extract pecuniary benefits for him-
self or his family. He may make business decisions that favor cronies of the family or that en-
hance personal reputation in the community at the expense of the company. He may hire incom-
petent relatives for key positions (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Perez-Gonzales, 2006). All of 
these things can erode performance. They are made more serious because founder or family ex-
ecutives often have the power to entrench themselves in the company: they or their relatives may 
have enough shares or votes to keep themselves in office despite their poor performance (Burkart 
et al., 2003; Claessens et al., 2002). Thus lone founder or family managers may be reluctant to let 
go of firm leadership when their business outgrows their skills or capabilities (Boeker and Kari-
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chalil, 2002). Family successors, moreover, might lack the talent of outsiders drawn from a far 
larger talent pool (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Mehrotra et al., 2009) especially if they are entitled to 
management positions simply because of kinship (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Bloom & Van Reenen, 
2007). All of these factors suggest that the negative aspects of family and founder management 
may counteract or even outweigh the positive ones.  
 Hypothesis 2: Family and founder management will be negatively associated with 
 superior performance. 
 
3. Data and Sample 
3.1 Sample Composition 
Our sample consisted of the Standard & Poor’s 500 firms. We manually collected firm owner-
ship and top management composition data from corporate proxy statements submitted to the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the years 1994 to 2003. The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 requires officers, directors, and five-percent owners to disclose their hold-
ings. Proxy statements have been found to be the most accurate sources of information about 
corporate ownership structures in general (Anderson and Lee, 1997; Dlugosz et al., 2006). 
In addition to analyzing firm proxies to identify founder and family ownership and man-
agement, to resolve any ambiguities, we gathered information from Hoover’s Handbook of 
American Business, Gale Business Resources, a Business Week list of family firms (of Novem-
ber 10th 2003), the Twentieth-Century American Business Leaders Database at Harvard Business 
School, Forbes Lists of the 400 Richest Americans, Marquis Who’s Who in America, and infor-
mation available on the respective corporation’s website for each of the 10 years of the study. 
Our final sample constitutes an unbalanced panel data set with 3,058 observations from 419 
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firms. Any missing firm-year observations are due to missing data and the fact that some firms 
were not listed on the stock exchange over the entire period from 1994-2003. 
Approximately 37% of the observations in our sample fall into the categories of family or 
founder firms. Descriptive data on the industry representation of family firms in the sample are 
reported in Table 1. 
 
- Insert Table 1 here -  
 
3.2 Variables and Measurement 
Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is Tobin’s q – the market value of equity at the end of the year plus the 
book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). Due to its 
skewed distribution, we log that variable in our analyses. Tobin’s q is deemed a useful indicator 
of firm performance as it represents the valuation of a firm as it is determined by all market par-
ticipants based on their evaluation of a firm and its prospects (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). As 
such, it is more resistant than return measures to accounting anomalies and earnings manipula-
tions. 
 
Independent variables 
We measure family involvement by ownership stake and role in top management. Ownership by 
lone founder was measured as the percentage of common equity solely owned by the founder or 
a founder team where no relatives of these individuals served as major owners or officers of the 
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company.1 Ownership by family is the percentage of common equity owned by one or several 
founding family members, where relatives of the founder served as major owners or officers of 
the company. The variables ownership by family and ownership by lone founder are mutually 
exclusive. A family-owned firm cannot be a founder-owned firm and vice versa. The manage-
ment variables were constructed in a similar way: The dummy variable management by lone 
founder reflects the founder of the company serving as CEO and/or chairman. The dummy vari-
able management by family indicates that a member of the founding family other than the foun-
der serves as CEO and/or chairman. Whereas lone founder predictors solely refer to first genera-
tion firms, family predictors can also reflect later family generation firms. Our sample contained 
too few true first generation family firms to merit or permit separate analyses (N=11 firms). This 
is because what previous studies classify as first generation family firms are really quite a differ-
ent breed: namely lone founder firms in which there are no family members of the founder pre-
sent. Thus, following the convention of Miller et al. (2007), we classify these firms as lone foun-
der firms, as that is what they are. However in assessing the robustness of our findings and for 
purposes of comparing our results with earlier studies such as Anderson and Reeb (2003) and 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), we shall assess generational effects in a manner consistent with 
theirs. Specifically, we will create a first generation category by combining our family first gen-
eration firms with our lone founder firms. We then will distinguish the performance of this group 
from that of later generation family firms. 
 
                                                 
1  The proxy statements report all shareholders with more than 5% of stock. Shareholders with less than 5% are 
not reported unless they are also active as board members. 
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Control variables 
Firm specific control variables were chosen based on previous studies by Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) and mostly taken from COMPUSTAT Industrial Files. 
Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s foundation and controls for differences in firm 
life cycles. Firm size is the book value of total assets. As the distributions of size and age are 
skewed, logarithmic values are used. To control for the firm’s capital structure we use the ratio 
of the book value of debt to the market value of equity. R&D effects are measured by R&D ex-
penditures divided by total assets. So as not to confound the effects of the sales variable with the 
effects of R&D, we used total assets instead of sales as our denominator on both sides of the re-
gression equation. This conforms with prior studies of the effects of R&D expenditures on mar-
ket value (Hall, 1993; Hall and Oriani, 2006). The variable advertising/ assets represents adver-
tising expenses divided by total assets. Due to their skewed distributions, we logged both the 
R&D and the advertising variables. Investment intensity is assessed as capital expenditures di-
vided by property, plant, and equipment (CAPX/PPE). Our risk measure is calculated as the an-
nual variance of daily stock returns, obtained from the CRSP database (Center for Research on 
Security Prices, University of Chicago). 
Based on previous findings on the impact of governance arrangements on corporate per-
formance (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), we also control for the 
separation of voting from cashflow rights and for the presence of non-family blockholders. We 
use the dummy supershares to account for firms which use different share classes to split voting 
from cashflow rights. Since large non-family blockholders can provide a valuable monitoring 
role, we include a variable that measures the percentage of stock owned by large banks, insur-
ance companies, mutual funds, private equity firms and large individual financial investors. In 
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addition, we have controlled for industry in two ways: dummy variables based on 2-digit SIC 
codes for the 53 different industries in the sample (Tables 4 and 6), and market-to-book values 
for each industry sector (Tables 5 and 7). Finally, time dummies for the years 1994-2003 are in-
cluded in some models to control for macro-economic effects (Tables 4 and 6). Table 2 defines 
the variables in detail. 
 
- Insert Table 2 here - 
 
4. Method 
4.1 The Bayesian Approach 
There are two fundamental approaches to statistics: the traditional “classical” approach of null 
hypothesis significance testing and the Bayesian approach. In contrast to the classical approach, 
the product of a Bayesian analysis is the entire distribution function of an effect of interest, 
which permits a researcher to be very precise about the degree of support for a particular hy-
pothesis. Yet, due to computational difficulties, the Bayesian approach has been less often used, 
and is therefore less known. Bayesian statistics rely on Bayes’ theorem of probability theory 
(Bayes, 1763): 
 
)Pr(
)Pr()|Pr()|Pr(
y
yy θθθ = ,     (1) 
 
where θ  represents the set of unknown parameters and y  represents the data. )Pr(θ is the prior 
distribution of the parameter set θ , which may be derived from theory, expert opinion, or other 
external resources. )|Pr( θy  is the likelihood function, which is the probability of the data y giv-
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en the unknown parameter set θ . Pr(y) is the marginal distribution of the data y, and finally, 
)|Pr( yθ  represents the posterior distribution, which is the probability of the parameter set θ  
given the data y. This equation may also be written as 
 
)Pr()|Pr()|Pr( θθθ yy ∝ ,      (2) 
 
where ∝  means ‘proportional to’. The posterior distribution is proportional to the likelihood 
function multiplied by the prior distribution. In Bayesian statistics, inference comes from the 
posterior distribution, which states the likelihood of a particular parameter value. 
When testing a hypothesized relationship between two variables, Bayesian analysis pro-
ceeds as follows. First, a priori beliefs (from theory) about the relationship of interest are formu-
lated (the prior distribution, )Pr(θ ). Next, a probability of occurrence of the data given these a 
priori beliefs is assumed (the likelihood function, )|Pr( θy ). In a third step, data are used to up-
date these beliefs. The result is the posterior distribution, )|Pr( yθ . This posterior distribution 
provides a density function of the parameter of interest (i.e., the coefficient that describes the re-
lationship between the two variables). The posterior distribution allows for statements in terms of 
likely and unlikely parameter values. 
 
4.2 Contrasts with Null Hypothesis Significance Testing 
Null hypothesis significance testing has been criticized for various reasons (Cohen, 1994; 
Schmidt, 1996; Starbuck, 2006). One criticism is that journals almost never publish non-
significant results and thereby present a biased picture of the reality. Furthermore, the statistical 
significance required for publication (in most cases 5%) is arbitrary and has no mathematical ba-
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sis. More importantly, overstressing statistical significance draws attention away from the size of 
the effect and its (economic) relevance − a statistically significant result can almost always be 
found with a large enough sample. 
Bayesian methods represent a useful alternative approach, one that has now become feasi-
ble due to today’s more powerful software packages. To understand the differences between 
Bayesian and classical methods, it is important first to recap the basics of null hypothesis signifi-
cance testing. The null hypothesis testing approach defines a population and draws a sample 
from it to learn about the value of a particular parameter. The view is that a parameter varies 
over the population due to sampling variation. The statistician’s task is to arrive at the ‘true’ pa-
rameters using the evidence provided by the sample. To achieve this, a sample estimator and an 
accompanying test statistic are selected, which are known to follow a particular distribution. A 
comparison of the value of the test statistic and its distribution then leads to a p-value, which is 
the probability that the hypothesis “the true parameter in the population equals the sample esti-
mator” can be rejected. 
The Bayesian approach is different. As noted, the result of Bayesian analysis is a poste-
rior distribution of the parameter of interest. This differs from null hypothesis significance test-
ing in that the outcome of the estimation is not a point estimate – which is either statistically sig-
nificant or not – but an entire distribution function. This way, Bayesian analysis allows for 
statements such as “the probability of a positive effect of a particular independent variable on the 
dependent variable is 70%”. The traditional approach only permits statements such as “the effect 
of a particular independent variable on the dependent variable is positive; the probability of this 
statement being erroneous is below 5%.” The result of Bayesian analysis is more intuitive in that 
it states the likelihood that a particular independent variable has a positive effect or not. Bayesian 
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analysis is not tied to the notion of a sample and a population. The result of a Bayesian analysis 
is a statement about the particular data that is used in the analysis. There is no statement about a 
‘true’ parameter in an underlying distribution (the population). 
 
4.3 Our Motivation to use Bayesian Methods 
Bayesian methods are used widely in the biological (e.g., Woodworth, 2004) and medical sci-
ences (e.g., Goodman, 2005). They also have become prevalent in econometric analysis in recent 
years.2 First applied in macroeconomics and decision theory, Bayesian methods have found their 
way to other social sciences, particularly with applications in marketing research.3 So far how-
ever, only few Bayesian studies exist in management research. A rare example is Hansen et al. 
(2004), who used the approach to operationalize the resource-based view.4 The use of Bayesian 
methods can make a contribution to the literature of family firm performance, which, as we have 
noted, has produced contradictory results. Bayesian methods have two main advantages in this 
regard: 
First, Bayesian statistics offers interpretations that are more intuitive and consistent with 
theory. Instead of stating whether or not family or lone founder firms have superior performance 
(thereby rejecting one alternative as being irrelevant), Bayesian statistics give the probability that 
these firms have superior performance. More concretely, the result of Bayesian statistics is an 
updated belief (i.e., the updated prior distribution) about the distribution of the effect of a par-
ticular variable given the information in the data. Thus, given the data and the prior, Bayesian 
statistics return the exact probability distribution of the effect of a given variable, something not 
                                                 
2  See The Economist (2006) for a discussion of the application of Bayesian methods in social sciences. 
3  Rossi and Allenby (2003) discuss the potentials of Bayesian statistics in marketing science. 
4  Hahn and Doh (2006) discuss the potentials for Bayesian methods in strategy research. 
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possible with classical statistics where the result is only a point estimate which either is or is not 
significant. 
Second, since Bayesian methods do not rely on significance tests and asymptotic assump-
tions, they have strong small sample properties and are more robust to multicollinearity problems 
as compared to classical null hypothesis significance testing (Hahn and Doh, 2006; Leamer, 
1973). Multicollinearity is caused by a lack of information in the data. As an extreme example, 
imagine family ownership and family management were perfectly correlated. Then, neither clas-
sical nor Bayesian statistics could disentangle their effects (a Bayesian estimator would simply 
return the prior). Bayesian statistics, however, do have an advantage when the correlation is less 
than perfect, but high enough to cause problems with classical significance testing. Say the corre-
lation between family ownership and family management were r=0.7. Using classical statistics, 
one or both of the estimators would most likely return a non-significant result. The situation is 
different with Bayesian statistics: if the data are informative – which is likely with a less than 
perfect correlation between two variables – the posterior distribution will be different from the 
prior distribution and conclusions could be drawn about the effect of both family management 
and family ownership. This capability allows us to separate the performance effects of family 
ownership and management, which we have hypothesized to be quite different. Although prior 
studies have taken into account both ownership and management, they have been required to do 
so in separate predictive models given the high correlations among family ownership and man-
agement (in our case about 0.5). Our Bayesian model includes both of these family firm charac-
teristics in the same predictive model and is thereby able to assess the relative effect of each 
upon firm performance. 
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4.4 Description of the Bayesian Model Estimated 
The Bayesian approach is more demanding than classical null hypothesis testing approach in the 
pre-estimation phase, as specific assumptions regarding the likelihood function and the prior dis-
tribution are required. Yet, this investment pays off since the posterior distribution permits infer-
ences that are more fine-grained. For the coefficients, we assume a normally distributed prior 
with a mean of zero for all coefficients. Such a prior specification implies that the model has no 
explanatory power at all. This ensures that any evidence for the validity of one particular effect is 
not induced by the specification of the prior. When collinearity is present in the data, which is 
likely because of the strong correlation between family management and family ownership, the 
posterior distributions of the effects of our variables may be sensitive to changes in the prior dis-
tributions. To overcome this potential problem, we varied the mean of our prior distributions 
from -0.5 to 0.5 and analyzed the sensitivity on the posterior distributions to the choice of the 
priors (see Table A2 for the sensitivity analysis). Since we have panel data, we also need to ac-
count for individual firm effects. For the prior distribution of the individual effects, we choose 
either a uniform distribution or a normal distribution. For the coefficients’ respective likelihood 
functions, we assume normal distributions with parameters derived from our econometric model. 
In most cases, the posterior distribution is multidimensional, i.e. it encompasses several 
parameters. However, we are interested in the specific distribution of the two parameters of fam-
ily management and family ownership. These specific distributions cannot be deduced analyti-
cally by using methods of numerical integration. To this end, a simulation approach is used. A 
computer generates simulated samples from the required distribution. We apply Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo Techniques (MCMC) and a Gibbs Sampler to arrive at the corresponding univariate 
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distributions of the coefficients.5 For the estimation and the simulation, we use a MatlabTM code, 
which takes 11,000 draws from the (joint) posterior distribution.6 As usual, the first 1,000 draws 
are discarded.7 
 
5. Regression Results 
5.1 Replication of Earlier Work 
Our data differ from some recent studies on family firm performance due to our use of S&P 500 
firms instead of Fortune 500 or Fortune 1000 companies (c.f. Villalonga and Amit, 2006 and 
Miller et al., 2007, respectively). The S&P 500 index is made up of large, regularly traded public 
firms which reflect the overall structure of the American economy. By contrast, Fortune 500 
firms are chosen only according to gross revenue. Whereas S&P 500 firms are all publicly 
traded, Fortune 500 firms may be privately held. 
The S&P 500 (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and Fortune 500 or 1000 samples (Miller et al., 
2007; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) have been used in previous performance studies of lone foun-
der and family firms. We chose the S&P 500 firms rather those from Fortune as these are pub-
licly traded on a regular basis. A strong public interest in these companies of private and institu-
tional investors makes S&P 500 companies quite transparent.  
Despite these advantages, Anderson and Reeb (2003) are the only scholars with our ques-
tion who chose S&P 500 firms for their analysis. Our data sample overlaps with theirs for the 
time period from 1994 to 1999. When taking the subsample of our firms that correspond to theirs 
                                                 
5  See Lancaster (2004, pp. 183-226) to learn more about Markov Chain Monte Carlo Techniques (MCMC) and 
the Gibbs Sampler. 
6  The MatlabTM code is available from the authors. As an alternative, one might also use the software package 
WinBUGS, which is freely available from the internet website of the Medical Research Council at University of 
Cambridge. See http://www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs (accessed January 14th, 2010). 
7  The quality of the sample derived from a Markov chain improves as a function of the steps, i.e. the draws taken. 
See Robert and Casella (2004). 
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and applying similar control variables and regression analyses, we are able to replicate their main 
results for family firm and family CEO dummies and for the level of family ownership (the fam-
ily firm definition of Anderson & Reeb (2003) encompasses lone founder firms). Results are 
available from the authors. In short, our data do correspond closely to those used in a well-
established study, one that is most consistent in its findings with several that follow (Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006; Miller et al. 2007). Thus any variations in our findings using the Bayesian me-
thodology should be due more to differences in method rather than differences in data. 
 
5.2 Results of Bayesian Analysis 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. As expected, correlations between the ownership and 
management variables are high (e.g., the correlation between the variables ownership share of 
family and management by family is r=0.50, p<0.01). It is difficult to separate the hypothesized 
management and ownership effects using classical methods. Using a Bayesian approach to esti-
mate these effects was expected to provide further insights. 
 
- Insert Table 3 here - 
 
As noted, the results of Bayesian regressions are not point estimates but entire distribu-
tion functions of the effects of the independent variables included in the respective regression 
(the posterior distributions). Thus, Bayesian analysis allows for statements of likely and unlikely 
parameter values of the respective coefficient. To describe an effect, Bayesian statisticians usu-
ally report a credible interval, which is the interval which contains the parameter of interest with 
a certain probability. Following convention (Lancaster, 2004), we report in this paper the 90%-
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credible intervals for those coefficients related to our hypotheses. If the 90%-credible interval of 
the particular coefficient is above 0 (below 0), we classify the effect as a strong positive (strong 
negative) effect, if the 90%-credible interval contains the 0, we classify the effect as neutral. 
Table 4 and 5 show the results of our Bayesian random effects regressions. The two esti-
mations differ in their treatment of industry effects. Table 4 displays the results of a regression in 
which industry effects are accounted for by using 2-digit SIC dummies; Table 5 shows the re-
sults of a regression in which industry effects are controlled for by including mean industry per-
formance as a control variable. The results are quite consistent across both approaches. 
 
- Insert Tables 4 and 5 here - 
 
Ownership variables: the results for the ownership variables are in line with our expecta-
tions: Both a higher ownership share of family and a higher ownership share of founders exert a 
positive effect on financial performance. The probability that the variable ownership by family 
has a positive effect is 96% (Table 4) or 98% (Table 5). The mean coefficients are β=0.43 or 
β=0.44. A similar result is found for the variable ownership by lone founder. The probability that 
the variable ownership by lone founder exerts a positive influence is 94% (Table 4) or 78% (Ta-
ble 5). The mean coefficients are β=0.44 (Table 4) and β=0.21 (Table 5). In sum, we find strong 
evidence for a positive effect of both family and founder ownership on performance (hypothesis 
1). In three out of four cases, the 90%-credible interval was above 0. 
Management variables: The results for the management variables differ to some degree 
from our hypothesized relationships. Family management seems to exert a slightly negative in-
fluence. The probability of having a positive effect is only 42% (Table 4) or 34% (Table 5). Dif-
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ferent results are observed for lone founder management. The probability of having a positive 
effect is 74% (Table 4) or 58% (Table 5). In sum, our regression models indicate a neutral effect 
of the management variables (hypothesis 2), but more so for family than for lone founders. How-
ever, in all four cases, the zero was included in the 90%-credible interval. 
Taken together, our results suggest that ownership and management are indeed two dis-
tinct dimensions of family firms exerting different influences on performance. Figures 1 to 4 dis-
play the distributions of the effects of the ownership and management variables graphically. 
 
- Insert Figures 1 to 4 here - 
Control variables: the results regarding our control variables are mostly as expected. We 
find strong positive effects for the variables research intensity, investment intensity, market risk, 
and firm age, whereas the variables debt/equity, outside blockholders and total assets seem to 
exert a strong negative effect on performance. 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
Our random-effects estimations assume that the firm-specific individual error term follows a 
normal distribution. To check whether our results are sensitive to this assumption, we also esti-
mated our model with a Bayesian fixed-effects estimator.8 The results are similar (see Table 6 
and 7). The ownership variables have strong positive effects, whereas the effects of the manage-
ment variables appear at best to be neutral. 
 
                                                 
8  In classical econometrics, one would conduct of Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) which tests whether the coeffi-
cients obtained from the random-effects model deviate in a systematic way from the coefficients obtained from 
the fixed-effects model. A significant test-statistic indicates that the fixed-effects model should be preferred 
over the random-effects model.  
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- Insert Tables 6 and 7 here - 
As a further check of the robustness of the results, we also estimated our models with dif-
ferent prior specifications. We allowed for different means and variances in the normal distribu-
tion and for different classes of distributions such as a uniform distribution. Regardless of the 
prior specifications chosen, we obtained similar results (see Table A2) 
We wished to determine whether our results were robust to the generational distinctions 
found in earlier studies such as Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). To 
do so we assessed generational effects in a manner consistent with theirs by creating a first gen-
eration category that combines our family first generation firms with our lone founder firms. We 
then distinguished this group from later generation family firms. The results are presented in Ap-
pendix I. As in earlier studies, we found that ownership was most strongly associated with posi-
tive performance in the first generation (99% in the first generation and 80% in later generations, 
with much smaller median effects for later generations). That was not, however, true of man-
agement (the respective figures were 54% and 63%). Again our thematic distinction surfaced be-
tween ownership and management effects: consistent with our other findings, ownership effects 
were more likely to be positive than management effects, regardless of generation for both lone 
founder and family firms. 
Finally, we shall examine whether our results hold when ownership is assumed to be en-
dogenous to performance (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). To this end, 
we construct an instrument using log assets, market risk, debt/equity and industry variables to 
predict the family and founder variables, and then we use the resulting predicted values in the 
Bayesian regressions (Tables 4-7). Endogenity does not change our main conclusions. The own-
ership variables were found to have a positive effect, whereas the management variables have a 
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neutral effect. This result is not surprising, since family owners and founders have been shown to 
be reluctant to sell their firms or abandon their managerial positions simply for performance rea-
sons – especially during the short run (James, 2006; Landes, 2006). Thus it was unlikely that en-
dogeneity would influence our results concerning the relationship between governance and per-
formance. This fact has been also borne out by previous US studies of family firm performance 
which have used both treatment effects models and instrumental variables regressions to assess 
endogeneity effects (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Miller et al., 2007). 
 
6. Discussion 
Reasoning from agency theory, we hypothesized that family ownership and management would 
show diverging effects on corporate performance. Our findings indicate that family influences 
are indeed Janus-faced: family ownership shows a strong positive effect whereas family man-
agement has a neutral effect. Our results suggest that the mixed findings of earlier performance 
studies might be explained by the particular definitions of family businesses and the way per-
formance effects were measured.  
Some studies defined family influence according to family ownership (Barth et al., 2005, 
Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002), others have used family management presence 
(Bennedsen et al., 2007; Fahlenbrach, 2006), while others still have employed both criteria (An-
derson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Since family ownership and management 
have diverging firm performance effects, the way these variables are reflected in the definition of 
a family business can influence performance results.  
To date, two different but potentially biased approaches have been used to assess the per-
formance effects of family ownership and management (e.g. Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Miller 
et al., 2007). If one examines only family ownership or family management, or conducts separate 
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regressions for either one, an omitted variables bias may occur. By contrast, if one combines 
both dimensions using traditional regression analyses, the effects attributed to family ownership 
and management may be biased as both indicators tend to be highly correlated. This problem of 
confounding ownership and management effects may account for the many conflicting findings 
among studies of family firm performance (compare Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Claessens et al., 
2002; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Miller et al., 2007; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Weber et 
al., 2003). As we have argued, classical regression techniques that rely on null hypothesis testing 
cannot resolve these conflicts. Our Bayesian approach, however, represents an alternative that is 
robust to multicollinearity (Hahn and Doh, 2006; Leamer, 1973). Thus we were able to estimate 
the performance effects of family management and family ownership variables in a single re-
gression with unbiased predictors. 
According to our results, the performance enhancing effect of family ownership is in line 
with positive agency expectations for family blockholders -- parties argued to have information 
advantages, higher incentives for management control, and lower monitoring costs (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Family owners have also been shown to pursue a 
long-term orientation and to focus on sustainable growth and profits (Miller and Le Breton-
Miller, 2005). In our analyses, founder and family ownership contribute positively to firm per-
formance. These findings significantly qualify earlier research by authors such as Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), Miller et al. (2007) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) who found that family-owned 
firms did not outperform other companies after the founder had left. We believe that is because 
this and indeed all previous research in the area confounds family ownership with the less salu-
tary impact of family management.  
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As to family management, our findings suggest at best a neutral but neither clearly infe-
rior nor superior performance effect, again challenging much of the previous research. Some stu-
dies have argued that family management adversely affects firm performance due to nepotism, 
cronyism, and entrenchment problems. Family managers are said to lack skills and experience 
and to pursue private benefits (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Burkart et al., 2003; Claessens et 
al., 2002; Morck et al., 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Volpin, 2002). Cucculelli and Micucci 
(2008) reported that family successors underperform founders in previously high performing 
founder firms. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) too found that family-successor led firms significantly un-
derperformed other firms – especially if family CEOs lacked a college education. Finally, Bloom 
and Van Reenen (2007) showed significant underperformance of family firms but only where the 
eldest son became CEO “by rule”. Other literature has suggested the opposite – that family man-
aged firms may actually outperform other firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Arregle et al., 2007; 
Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Ward, 2005; Weber, 2003). Collectively, these studies found 
that family managed firms either underperformed or outperformed other companies – rather 
dramatic conclusions perhaps motivated by the use of conventional statistical approaches. By 
contrast, our analysis shows a far more moderate outcome: the performance effects for family 
management do not reach the 90%/ 10% probability levels in Bayesian analysis – levels which 
would reflect an unambiguous effect on performance. The probability that family management 
will positively affect firm performance is only 43% or 34% (Tables 4 and 5). In other words, 
family management is ambiguous rather than negative (or positive) in its impact. 
Our findings also inform the literature on founder-managed firms which again has pro-
duced mixed performance findings. Using conventional regression analysis, He (2008) reported 
that only founder-CEO status enhances firm performance whereas CEO ownership is detrimen-
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tal. In contrast, Jayaraman et al. (2000) found no performance effect of founder-CEO status. 
Again, these mixed performance results may stem from multicollinearity that disguises the true 
effects of founder ownership and management. Our Bayesian results indicate that only lone 
founder ownership is clearly associated with higher firm performance (94% or 78% probability 
of a positive effect). By contrast, the effect of lone founder presence in management is less clear 
(74% or 58% probability of a positive effect). These more fine grained findings suggest that con-
tinued founder management does not unambiguously enhance firm performance -- a finding that 
neither supports nor clearly contradicts studies arguing that a firm’s growth overwhelms founder 
expertise (Boeker and Karichalil, 2002; Wasserman, 2003; Willard et al., 1992), and with re-
search advocating the benefits of replacing founders with outside, “professional” managers (Dai-
ly and Dalton, 1992; Flamholtz, 1990).  
Our results suggest that ownership succession to family members in lone founder and 
family firms is not a concern. As for founders, ownership of founder descendents is likely to po-
sitively affect firm performance. However, the likelihood of a positive performance effect from a 
family successor in top management is much lower compared to the founder management effect.  
In a nutshell, founders can pass on firm ownership to their families but should consider being 
succeeded in leadership by professional rather than family management.   
In the end, the Bayesian statistics allow us to separate the effects of ownership and man-
agement. We believe that it is more important to place probabilities on outcomes of interest than 
to feel obliged to assert flatly that there is a positive, negative or “null” effect. The latter asser-
tions often give rise to interminable pro-con debates, the former simply inform decision makers 
about the probabilities of focal outcomes. 
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7. Limitations and Future Research 
Our research has several limitations that suggest opportunities for future research. First, whereas 
our analysis clearly showed positive effects of family and founder ownership, the results for fam-
ily and lone founder management variables were less definitive. Future research might benefit 
from the use of additional governance variables and different samples to analyze the conditions 
under which family and lone founder management influence firm performance. Second, research 
may also be warranted to study the impact of having multiple family branches and in-laws pre-
sent in ownership and management. The number of family managers and lone founder managers, 
the positions they hold and their educational backgrounds might also be considered. Third, it will 
be useful to examine the strategic and organizational variables that account for and mediate be-
tween the relationships between our ownership and governance variables and firm performance. 
Finally, as our findings only apply to very large and publicly traded firms in the US, generaliza-
tion beyond those limits may not be warranted. Additional research would be needed to replicate 
our results in private firms. 
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Table 1: Number and percent of family or founder firms by 2-digit SIC industry 
SIC 
Code 
 
Industry description 
Non-family 
firm obs. 
Family or founder 
 firm obs. 
Family of founder 
firm obs. (in %) 
10 Metal mining 2 10 83% 
13 Oil and gas extraction 76 18 19% 
14 Mining nonmetalics, except fuels 10 0 0% 
15 General building contractors 18 8 31% 
16 Heavy construction, except buildings 12 0 0% 
20 Food and kindred products 55 49 47% 
21 Tobacco products 15 0 0% 
23 Apparel and other textile products 7 28 80% 
24 Lumber and wood products 17 16 49% 
25 Furniture and fixtures 8 7 47% 
26 Paper and allied products 45 9 17% 
27 Printing and publishing 34 33 49% 
28 Chemical and allied products 168 78 32% 
29 Petroleum and coal products 18 10 36% 
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products  37 10 21% 
33 Primary metal industries 31 22 42% 
34 Fabricated metal products 49 5 9% 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 137 71 34% 
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment 135 149 52% 
37 Transportation equipment 108 6 5% 
38 Instruments and related products 101 61 38% 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing products 18 10 36% 
40 Railroad transportation 29 0 0% 
42 Trucking and warehousing 4 0 0% 
44 Water transportation 0 9 100% 
45 Transportation by air 8 15 65% 
48 Communications 25 46 65% 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 156 19 11% 
50 Wholesale trade—durable goods 9 10 53% 
51 Wholesale trade—nondurable goods 28 11 28% 
52 Building materials and gardening 12 7 37% 
53 General merchandise stores 51 26 34% 
54 Food stores 33 7 18% 
55 Auto dealers and service stations  7 9 56% 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 6 30 83% 
57 Furniture and home furnishings 16 19 54% 
58 Eating and drinking places 14 8 36% 
59 Miscellaneous retail 26 21 45% 
60 Depository institutions 0 7 100% 
61 Nondepository institutions 21 16 43% 
62 Security and commodity brokers 34 20 37% 
63 Insurance carriers 133 64 32% 
64 Insurance agents, brokers, services  9 10 53% 
67 Holding and other investment offices 3 23 88% 
70 Hotels and other lodging places 0 23 100% 
72 Personal services 0 10 100% 
73 Business services 128 114 47% 
75 Auto repair, services, and parking 10 0 0% 
78 Motion pictures 3 0 0% 
79 Amusement and recreation services 9 0 0% 
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Table 1 (continued): Number and percent of family or founder firms by 2-digit SIC indus-
try 
 
80 Health services 29 9 24% 
87 Engineering and management services 4 10 71% 
99 Nonclassifiable establishments 6 0 0% 
 Total 1,915 1,143 37% 
     
Note: a firm is classified as a founder/family firm if either a member of the family/the founder is CEO or Chaiman 
          or the family/founder owns more than 5% of common equity. 
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Table 2: Description of variables 
Variable Description 
  
Log (market-to-book value) 
Calculated as market value of equity (MKVALF) + book value of 
total debt (DT) + convertible debt and preferred stock (DCPSTK) + 
current liabilities (CL) – Current Assets (CA) divided by book value 
of total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
Ownership by family 
Percentage of shares of family (excluding lone founders). If there is 
no member of the founding family present as owner, the variable 
takes a value of zero. Sources: Company’s proxy statements (mostly 
DEF 14A), Hoovers Handbook of American Business, and com-
pany’s websites 
Ownership by lone founder 
Percentage of shares of a lone founder. If there is no lone founder 
present as owner, the variable takes a value of zero. Sources: Com-
pany’s proxy statements (mostly DEF 14A), Hoovers Handbook of 
American Business, and company’s websites. 
Management by family 
Dummy =1 if member of family is CEO or Chairman. Sources: 
Company’s proxy statements (mostly DEF 14A), Hoovers Hand-
book of American Business, and company’s websites. 
Management by lone founder 
Dummy =1 if lone founder is CEO or Chairman. Sources: Com-
pany’s proxy statements (mostly DEF 14A), Hoovers Handbook of 
American Business, and company’s websites. 
Industry market-to-book value (mean) 
Industry market-to-book value is calculated for all firms in the data-
set at a 2 digit SIC. Source: Compustat 
Log (R&D/assets) 
R&D expenditures (XRD) divided by total assets (AT). Firms with 
missing data were coded=0.001. Source: Compustat 
Log (Advertising/assets) 
Advertising expenses (XAD) divided by total assets (AT). Firms 
with missing data were coded=0. Source: Compustat 
Investment intensity (CAPX/PPE) 
Capital expenditures (CAPX) divided by gross property, plant, and 
equipment (PPEGT). Firms with missing data were coded=0. 
Source: Compustat 
Market risk 
The firm’s beta calculated as the firm’s daily return regressed 
against the returns of the S&P 500 index. Source: CRSP 
Debt/equity Calculated as book value of total debt (DT) divided by market value of common equity (MKVALF). Source: Compustat. 
Supershares Dummy =1 if firm uses supershares such as dual class stock. Source: Company’s proxy statements, mostly DEF 14a 
Outside blockholders Percentage of shares of outside blockholders. Source: Company’s proxy statements (mostly DEF 14A) 
Log (total assets) The natural log of total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
Log (firm age) The natural log of years since the firm was founded.  Sources: firm websites, Hoovers Handbook of American Business 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
  Min. Max Mean Median 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
     
1 Log (market-to-book value) -2.58 4.34 0.35 0.28 
2 Ownership by family 1 0 0.89 0.03 0 0.06              
3 Ownership by lone founder 1 0 0.84 0.02 0 0.15 -0.09             
4 Management by family 0 1 0.10 0 -0.05 0.50 -0.09            
5 Management by lone founder 0 1 0.20 0 0.24 -0.06 0.43 -0.17           
6 Industry market-to-book value (mean) 0.40 8.32 2.08 1.73 0.58 0.01 0.14 -0.09 0.18          
7 Log (R&D/assets) 0 0.60 0.03 0 0.39 -0.08 0.11 -0.14 0.18 0.41         
8 Log (advertising/assets) 0 0.23 0 0.01 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.09 -0.03        
9 Investment intensity (CAPX/PPE) 0 2.59 0.12 0.1 0.43 -0.02 0.21 -0.03 0.30 0.35 0.29 0.07       
10 Market risk -0.21 3.67 0.86 0.86 0.26 -0.05 0.22 -0.07 0.30 0.26 0.42 -0.04 0.40      
11 Debt/equity 0 36.44 0.55 0.18 -0.17 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.13 -0.14 -0.07 -0.06 0.04     
12 Supershares 0 1 0.05 0 -0.04 0.23 0.06 0.25 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.03    
13 Outside blockholders 0 0.99 0.14 0.12 -0.05 -0.20 -0.10 -0.15 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.09   
14 Log (total assets) 3.61 13.83 8.64 8.48 -0.50 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 -0.18 -0.36 -0.35 -0.10 -0.30 -0.15 0.35 0.02 -0.18  
15 Log (firm age) 0 5.41 3.90 4.16 -0.35 0.06 -0.26 0.07 -0.42 -0.29 -0.35 0.09 -0.42 -0.37 0.11 0.04 -0.11 0.38 
     
 
Notes: N=3,058 obs.; all correlations with an absolute above r=0.04 have a p-value less than 0.05. The descriptive statistics refer to the variables as they are 
included in the econometric analysis. In particular, the logged variables are therefore difficult to interpret. The descriptive statistics referring to the non-
logged variables R&D/assets, advertising/assets, total assets, and firm age can be obtained from the corresponding author. 
 
1 The family and lone founder ownership variables include also the observations that do not relate to family or founder firms, which is why the means of the vari 
  ables are only 2% or 3%. 
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Table 4: Bayesian random-effects regression of financial performance (with industry and year dummies) 
Dependent variable: Log (market-to-book value) 
 
 Quantiles of the posterior distribution 
Independent variables Mean coefficient Std. dev. 
Probability of 
Coeff. > 0 5
th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
         
    
Ownership by family 0.427 0.247 95.7% 0.019 0.258 0.429 0.595 0.830 
Ownership by lone founder 0.440 0.285 94.3% -0.020 0.246 0.436 0.632 0.912 
Management by family -0.013 0.059 41.7% -0.110 -0.053 -0.012 0.027 0.082 
Management by lone founder 0.033 0.052 73.9% -0.053 -0.002 0.033 0.068 0.118 
Log (R&D/assets) 0.033 0.023 92.6% -0.004 0.018 0.034 0.049 0.070 
Log (advertising/assets) 0.010 0.011 81.2% -0.008 0.002 0.009 0.017 0.027 
Investment intensity (CAPX/PPE) 0.964 0.095 100% 0.809 0.900 0.965 1.028 1.120 
Market risk 0.111 0.023 100% 0.074 0.096 0.111 0.126 0.148 
Debt/equity -0.034 0.009 0% -0.048 -0.040 -0.034 -0.027 -0.018 
Supershares 0.188 0.123 93.3% -0.016 0.104 0.186 0.271 0.392 
Outside blockholders -0.315 0.085 0% -0.453 -0.372 -0.317 -0.258 -0.175 
Log (total assets) -0.203 0.022 0% -0.239 -0.218 -0.204 -0.188 -0.167 
Log (firm age) 0.232 0.092 98.8% 0.081 0.173 0.231 0.292 0.390 
Industry dummies 1 52 categories 
Year dummies 2 9 categories 
    
  
N observations (firms) 3,058 (419) 
Observations per firm: min., mean, max. 1; 7.3; 10 
  
 
Notes:  As priors for the effects of the independent variables we use normal distributions with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one. Number of draws: 11,000 (the first 1,000 draws are discarded). 
 
                  1 reference group: SIC 28 (chemical and allied products) 
                  2 reference group: Year 2003 
 
 36
Table 5: Bayesian random-effects regression of financial performance (with industry market-to-book value) 
Dependent variable: Log (market-to-book value) 
 
 Quantiles of the posterior distribution 
Independent variables Mean coefficient Std. dev. 
Probability of 
Coeff. > 0 5
th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
         
    
Ownership by family 0.439 0.226 97.8% 0.072 0.285 0.437 0.591 0.810 
Ownership by lone founder 0.212 0.275 78.1% -0.245 0.028 0.213 0.399 0.666 
Management by family -0.025 0.058 33.6% -0.122 -0.064 -0.025 0.015 0.070 
Management by lone founder 0.009 0.049 58.0% -0.007 -0.023 0.010 0.042 0.091 
Industry market-to-book value (mean) 0.199 0.007 100% 0.187 0.194 0.199 0.204 0.211 
Log (R&D/assets) 0.050 0.021 98.9% 0.016 0.036 0.050 0.065 0.086 
Log (adverstising/assets 0.016 0.010 93.9% -0.001 0.009 0.016 0.023 0.033 
Investment intensity (CAPX/PPE) 0.771 0.090 100% 0.622 0.712 0.771 0.832 0.917 
Market risk 0.074 0.021 99.9% 0.040 0.060 0.074 0.088 0.108 
Debt/equity -0.042 0.009 0% -0.057 -0.048 -0.042 -0.037 -0.028 
Supershares 0.043 0.125 64.1% -0.164 -0.042 0.048 0.130 0.242 
Outside blockholders -0.289 0.078 0% -0.419 -0.342 -0.287 -0.236 -0.161 
Log (total assets) -0.143 0.019 0% -0.174 -0.156 -0.143 -0.130 -0.112 
Log (firm age) 0.294 0.086 100% 0.149 0.237 0.296 0.351 0.441 
    
  
N observations (firms) 3,058 (419) 
Observations per firm: min., mean, max. 1; 7.3; 10 
  
 
Notes:  As priors for the effects of the independent variables we use normal distributions with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of  
            one. Number of draws: 11,000 (the first 1,000 draws are discarded). 
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Table 6: Bayesian fixed-effects regression of financial performance (with industry dummies) 
Dependent variable: Log (market-to-book value) 
 
 Quantiles of the posterior distribution 
Independent variables Mean coefficient Std. dev.. 
Probability of 
Coeff. > 0 5
th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
         
    
Ownership by family 0.446 0.167 99.7% 0.177 0.329 0.441 0.556 0.730 
Ownership by lone founder 0.445 0.211 98.1% 0.092 0.303 0.448 0.593 0.783 
Management by family -0.013 0.043 38.7% -0.084 -0.042 -0.012 0.016 0.059 
Management by lone founder 0.033 0.037 81.6% -0.026 0.008 0.032 0.057 0.095 
Log (R&D/assets) 0.035 0.017 98.3% 0.008 0.024 0.035 0.046 0.063 
Log (advertising/assets) 0.010 0.008 87.9% -0.004 0.004 0.010 0.015 0.023 
Investment intensity (CAPX/PPE) 0.966 0.078 100% 0.835 0.913 0.966 1.018 1.093 
Market risk 0.111 0.019 100% 0.080 0.098 0.111 0.123 0.141 
Debt/equity -0.034 0.007 0% -0.045 -0.038 -0.034 -0.029 -0.023 
Supershares 0.202 0.089 98.9% 0.050 0.136 0.197 0.259 0.343 
Outside blockholders -0.315 0.066 0% -0.421 -0.360 -0.315 -0.271 -0.208 
Log (total assets) -0.197 0.016 0% -0.228 -0.213 -0.202 -0.192 -0.177 
Log (firm age) 0.202 0.056 100% 0.138 0.205 0.243 0.279 0.324 
Year dummies 1 9 categories 
    
  
N observations (firms) 3,058 (419) 
Observations per firm: min., mean, max. 1; 7.3; 10 
  
 
Notes:  As priors for the effects of the independent variables we use normal distributions with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of  
            one. Number of draws: 11,000 (the first 1,000 draws are discarded). 
                  1 reference group: Year 2003 
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Table 7: Bayesian fixed-effects regression of financial performance (with industry market-to-book value) 
Dependent variable: Log (market-to-book value) 
 
 Quantiles of the posterior distribution 
Independent variables Mean coefficient Std. dev.. 
Probability of 
Coeff. > 0 5
th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
         
    
Ownership by family 0.445 0.161 99.7% 0.174 0.338 0.445 0.552 0.712 
Ownership by lone founder 0.216 0.196 86.6% -0.113 -0.086 0.217 0.346 0.534 
Management by family -0.024 0.040 27.9% -0.090 -0.051 -0.024 0.004 0.042 
Management by lone founder 0.010 0.035 60.6% -0.048 -0.014 0.009 0.033 0.065 
Industry market-to-book value (mean) 0.199 0.006 100% 0.190 0.196 0.199 0.203 0.209 
Log (R&D/assets) 0.050 0.015 99.9% 0.025 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.074 
Log (Advertising/assets) 0.017 0.007 99.0% 0.004 0.011 0.016 0.021 0.029 
Investment intensity (CAPX/PPE) 0.775 0.073 100% 0.654 0.627 0.775 0.824 0.893 
Market risk 0.074 0.016 100% 0.047 0.063 0.074 0.085 0.100 
Debt/equity -0.042 0.006 0% -0.052 -0.047 -0.042 -0.038 -0.032 
Supershares 0.059 0.087 74.5% -0.081 -0.001 0.055 0.118 0.205 
Outside blockholders -0.291 0.061 0% -0.391 -0.332 -0.291 -0.250 -0.191 
Log (total assets) -0.145 0.012 0% -0.165 -0.153 -0.145 -0.136 -0.124 
Log (firm age) 0.306 0.050 100% 0.221 0.275 0.308 0.339 0.381 
    
  
N observations (firms) 3,058 (419) 
Observations per firm: min., mean, max. 1; 7.3; 10 
  
 
Notes:  As priors for the effects of the independent variables we use normal distributions with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of  
             one. Number of draws: 11,000 (the first 1,000 draws are discarded). 
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Figure 1: The performance effect of ownership by family 
Note: The figure shows the (posterior) distribution of the variable ownership by family. The figure is based 
on the random-effects regression shown in Table 4. The probability that the variable exerts a positive 
effect is 96%. The median effect is ß=0.43.
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Figure 2: The performance effect of ownership by lone founder 
Note: The figure shows the (posterior) distribution of the variable ownership by lone founder. The figure is 
based on the random-effects regression shown in Table 4. The probability that the variable exerts a 
positive effect is 94%. The median effect is ß=0.44. 
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Figure 3: The performance effect of management by family 
Note: The figure shows the (posterior) distribution of the variable management by family. The figure is 
based on the random-effects regression shown in Table 4. The probability that the variable exerts a 
positive effect is 42%. The median effect is ß=-0.01. 
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Figure 4: The performance effect of management by lone funder 
Note: The figure shows the (posterior) distribution of the variable management by lone founder. The figure 
is based on the random-effects regression shown in Table 4. The probability that the variable exerts a 
positive effect is 74%. The median effect is ß=0.03.
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Appendix I 
 
Table A1: Bayesian random-effects regression of financial performance (with industry and year dummies) 
Dependent variable: Log (market-to-book value) 
 
 Quantiles of the posterior distribution 
Independent variables Mean coefficient Std. dev.. 
Probability of 
Coeff. > 0 5
th 25th 50th 75th 95th 
         
    
Ownership by family 1st generation 0.639 0.261 99.4% 0.222 0.458 0.636 0.813 1.076 
Ownership by family later generation 0.237 0.282 79.8% -0.227 0.046 0.234 0.430 0.694 
Management by family 1st generation 0.006 0.053 54.5% -0.083 -0.029 0.007 0.042 0.092 
Management by family later generation 0.021 0.062 63.0% -0.081 -0.022 0.021 0.063 0.123 
Log (R&D/assets) 0.035 0.023 93.4% -0.003 0.020 0.035 0.050 0.073 
Log (advertising/assets) 0.010 0.011 79.6% -0.009 0.002 0.009 0.016 0.026 
Investment intensity (CAPX/PPE) 0.968 0.095 100% 0.812 0.903 0.968 1.032 1.125 
Market risk 0.111 0.023 100% 0.073 0.095 0.111 0.126 0.148 
Debt/equity -0.034 0.009 0% -0.049 -0.040 -0.034 -0.027 -0.019 
Supershares 0.178 0.127 92.3% -0.029 0.092 0.178 0.262 0.387 
Outside blockholders -0.318 0.084 0% -0.456 -0.374 -0.317 -0.260 -0.179 
Log (total assets) -0.200 0.023 0% -0.239 -0.216 -0.201 -0.185 -0.162 
Log (firm age) 0.242 0.097 98.8% 0.080 0.180 0.245 0.305 0.401 
Industry dummies 1 52 categories 
Year dummies 2 9 categories 
    
  
N observations (firms) 3,058 (419) 
Observations per firm: min., mean, max. 1; 7.3; 10 
  
 
Notes: We use normally distributed priors with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Number of draws: 11,000 (the first 1,000 
draws are discarded). 
 
                  1 reference group: SIC 28 (chemical and allied products) 
                  2 reference group: Year 2003 
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Table A2: Sensitivity analysis regarding choice of prior 
Model: see Table 6 
 
 Mean of prior distribution 1 
Variables relating to hypotheses -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
            
            
Ownership by family 93.1% 96.3% 98.0% 98.7% 99.2% 99.7% 99.7% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 99.7% 
Ownership by lone founder 86.4% 92.0% 95.3% 97.0% 97.9% 98.1% 97.7% 97.7% 97.9% 98.2% 98.6% 
Management by family 34.7% 35.5% 35.9% 36.1% 35.9% 38.7% 39.0% 40.0% 41.7% 43.8% 45.8% 
Management by lone founder 84.1% 84.2% 84.0% 83.6% 82.8% 81.6% 82.3% 82.9% 83.4% 83.6% 84.1% 
            
 
Notes: The cells display the probability that the effect is positive (i.e., the probability of coeff. > 0); control variables of the regressions as in Table 6. 
 
                   1 The prior distribution is a normal distribution with mean as specified in the columns and variance of one. We use the same prior distribution for  
              all variables in the regression model. 
 
 
